2 First, states seek to control movement across territorial boundaries -exit as well as entry. Therefore, defining "transnationalism" in terms of the "regular and sustained" cross-border activities of individuals, as do Portes and his associates (Portes, et. al, 1999), takes for granted what needs to be explained; doing so also makes freedom of movement the point of departure, as if this were not a world divided by states, many of them expelling their undesirable residents or closing their doors to foreigners.
Second, state controls operate at internal as well as external levels, seeking to regulate membership in the national collectivity as well as movement across territorial borders. That both boundaries prove leaky is the rule, not the exception (Krasner, 1995) .
More relevant is the variability in the degree to which internal and external boundaries are institutionalized, and the means and intensity by which states police them. Together, these factors condition the ability of migrants living "here" to act in ways that yield leverage "there."
Third, civil society actors in both host and destination countries raise questions regarding the allegiance and political bona fides of persons whose social identities are largely framed by their connections to two states. The terms of national belonging are almost always the subject of conflict; variations in political culture ensure that they also differ from one nation-state to the other. Fourth, the relationship among states affects the scope for multiple versus exclusive national loyalties. The security/solidarity nexus waxes and wanes with the degree of inter-state tension. "Dual loyalty" becomes a particularly intense issue when belligerency develops between host and sending countries. Thus, while international migrants and their descendants recurrently engage in concerted action across state 3 boundaries, the use, form, and mobilization of the connections linking "here" and "there" are contingent outcomes subject to multiple political constraints.
We develop this argument in the pages to follow. Engaging the existing literature, we argue that conventional social science overlaps with folk understandings that nationstates normally contain societies (as implied by the concept of "American society"), which is why the appearance of foreigners and their foreign attachments are viewed as anomalies expected to disappear. Our point of departure is utterly different. Networks of people, information, and goods regularly span the boundaries of the state, leading international migration to consistently recur. Since a container model of society enjoys widespread legitimacy, the arrival of foreigners persistently sparks both state efforts to bound the societies they enclose and civil society attempts to reinforce the boundaries of the national community that international migration threatens to disrupt. Consequently, the standard depiction of "assimilation" and "transnationalism" as competing theoretical perspectives or analytic concepts misleads. While the sociological dictionary defines "assimilation" as the decline of an ethnic difference (Alba and Nee, 2003) , assimilation is also the making of difference between national 'peoples'. As ideology of the nation-state society, the sociology of assimilation necessarily obscures coercive efforts to build a nation-state society by excluding outsiders -via control of external borders -and to distinguish between members and unacceptable residents of the territory -through regulation of the internal boundaries leading to citizenship and legal residence. Likewise for "transnationalism," the relevant forms of social action do not transcend difference, but rather are directed entirely toward specific places or groups. In the end, "assimilation" 4 and "transnationalism" are each as particularistic as the other. The collision between these processes defines the phenomenon of interest to us here.
Rejecting the conventional views, we outline an alternative approach emphasizing the interactions of migrants with states and civil society actors in both sending and receiving countries. We apply that approach to show how sustained comparisons across time and place illuminate the sources of variation in migrant trans-state politics, a matter obscured by the current literature, preoccupied with the single case of the United States and a dehistoricized fixation on the "contemporary" period.
The Career of a Concept
The concept of "immigrant transnationalism" entered the literature through the work of anthropologists Glick Schiller, Basch, and Blanc-Szanton, who argued that the emergence of "transnational" social fields linking particular sending and destination countries represented a break with the past. Contrary to historical patterns and received social science notions, neither settlement nor the severing of home country ties was inevitable. In the contemporary age of migration, rather, "transmigrants …maintain, build, and reinforce multiple linkages with their countries of origins (Glick Schiller, et al, 1995:52) ," thereby expanding the range of "home" to encompass both "here" and "there."
So fundamental a change required entirely new concepts: "transnationalism" identified the social connections between receiving and sending countries; "transmigrants" denoted the people who forged and kept those ties alive (Glick Schiller, et al. 1992) .
Though the new idea quickly caught on, conceptual disagreements soon emerged.
One view emphasized transnationalism, a complex but fundamentally closed set of 5 relationships, so encompassing as to virtually erase the distinction between "here" and "there." The influential formulation developed by Portes and his associates exemplifies this stance: for them, the "concept of transnationalism" is delimited "to occupations and activities that require regular and sustained social contact over time across national borders for their implementation ." A different approach, emphasizing transnational practices, as opposed to a transnational condition of being, replaces the fine lines associated with "transnationalism" with a continuum: here, the regular, sustained trans-state practices underscored by Portes and his associates shade off into something more erratic and less intense (Levitt, 2001b) .
Further difficulties arose in conceptualizing the cross-border activities that interact with migrants' transnational engagements. One formulation contrasts the "transnationalism from above" of corporations and states with the "transnationalism from below" of international migrants (Smith and Guarnizo, 1998) . The severing of enterprise from its original, national base exemplifies the core of the transnational concept.
Describing the actions of states as "transnational," however, deprives the concept of analytic leverage, as it is meant to distinguish cross-border, non-state actors from states and show how the two constrain and shape one another. An alternative, identifying the linkage between sending states and their members on foreign soil as exemplifying the "deterritorialized nation-state," stretches the definition of the state beyond meaning.
States only legitimately possess the power of coercion within their own borders, and consular activities abroad depend on the acquiescence of hosts.
Additional conceptual permutations will surely arise. However, no disagreement exists regarding the relationship between "immigrant transnationalism" and receiving 6 states, largely because the matter has not been raised. 1 Aware that immigrant dual loyalties may produce allergic reactions among their "hosts," scholars have sought to calm such fears, noting that home country allegiances rarely persist to the second generation, in which event "transnational activities" should be accepted as they "can actually facilitate successful adaptation" (Portes, 1999: 472) . While the advice may be sensible, the absence of any concerted effort to analyze the relationship between "immigrant transnationalism" and receiving states and civil society actors is a fundamental omission.
The politics of "here" and "there":
Beyond nationalism -or particularism in long-distance form?
With sympathizers, if not adherents, of the transnationalist view at the helm of three scholarly journals (Diaspora, Identities, and Global Networks); an international center on "transnational communities" based at Oxford University; and a legion of supportive books, articles, and dissertations pouring out across the social sciences, the transnationalist moment would seem to be now. 2 One hesitates to be left standing in the station when the train is so obviously departing. Still, perhaps there is time for a spirited warning before everyone gets on board.
We agree that this new literature has drawn scholars' attention to a salient aspect of international migration. Alas, it has not delivered on its promise. International phenomena can be distinguished from those that are transnational. As argued by international relations scholars since the 1960s, the former pertains to relations between 7 states, the latter to institutions extending beyond and even encompassing states. But one simply has to invoke any of the many transnational institutions -whether the market, the Catholic Church, or the more recent networks of human rights activists -to see that transnational phenomena, properly speaking, have at best variable relevance to the migration cases at hand. It would be otherwise, were we talking about the last great age of migration, when no small proportion of the international movers understood themselves to be "workers of the world." But at the turn of the 21 st century, the best approximation of transnationalism of this sort is to be found among the "transnational capitalist class" (Sklair, 2001) , still bound to its country of origin, but increasingly oriented toward the elimination of economic nationalism. By contrast, the political behavior described by scholars of contemporary immigrant "transnationalism" is altogether different, involving long-distance, trans-state affiliations of a particularist sort -a form of social action entirely distinguishable from trans-nationalism in any of its incarnations.
Were it just a matter of nomenclature, the matter could be resolved easily.
Unfortunately, the literature conflates aspects of the phenomena intrinsically related to migration across nation-states with those that emerge under internal and international migration. Many of the most influential studies of "immigrant transnationalism" (Rouse, 1995; R. Smith, 2002; Levitt 2001a) Zacatecas and Jalisco thought to do the same (Waldinger and Fitzgerald, 2003) . Such affiliations and organizations based on distant hometowns result from the interaction between natives and strangers, and not necessarily the encounter between nationals and foreigners. Thus, discovering connections between "villages" or "communities" here and there hardly qualifies as transnational, as the same relationship reoccurs within almost any domestic or international migration.
To the extent that migrant bi-localism is a product of the migration experience, it represents a break with the experience of the stay-at-homes. Therefore, it also serves as a vehicle for innovation in the interaction between the migrants and their connections still at home making the use of holistic metaphors -like transnational community or villageinappropriate. Bi-localism can be a stage in the development of a broader set of identities, but not necessarily; often it works in the opposite direction, as the hometown association competes with other forms of organization that emphasize politics or ideology over affective ties. To survive, hometown associations have to unite right and left, believers and secularists, proletarians and entrepreneurs -which is why their anti-political bias is often so strong. Those conflicts also highlight a history of consistent contention over the precise nature of the homeland "community" to which loyalty is owed, suggesting that the literature's conceptualization of "transnationalism" is largely reification.
Trans-state migrant social action: conditions, constraints, consequences
If the concept of transnationalism cannot cover the many discrete, opposing phenomena to which its scholarly advocates would have it refer, the proliferation of ties extending beyond the territory that states seek to enclose does merit close attention.
These connections only violate those tenets of nationalist ideology that define normality as the conditions under which a nation is separate and distinct from the world found on its edges (Wimmer and Schiller, 2002) . While nationalist ideology and social science "theory" on the topic overlap -as unintentionally implied by Guarnizo et al. (2003: 6) , who position themselves against a "theoretical perspective" that "expects immigrants to have a single identity, national allegiance, and representation in one national polity" -the analyst's job is to take critical distance from the native theory of the world, not use it as the point of departure.
As noted, networks of information, goods, and services regularly extend beyond the limits of state institutions. The mass international migrations of the turn of the 20 th and 21 st centuries have entailed one-time return migration, repeat migration, and circular migration, as well as migration for settlement. Such flows leave large numbers of persons moving back and forth, not certain where to settle, let alone how much importance to place on the connections "here" versus "there". Gradually, the networks that breach the nation-state society pull migrants away from home environments, encouraging settlement. The short-to medium-term horizons, however, may look different. As long as migration increases, so does the prevalence of cross-border ties, a factor affecting the dispositions of veteran migrants as well as the opportunities they confront.
Since our interests lie in the constitutive aspects of movement across borders, we emphasize that states make migrations international by bounding territories and defining the nations they seek to enfold (Zolberg, 1999) . Population movement across state boundaries is inherently a political matter: it threatens to sever the alignment of territory, political institutions, and society that states try so hard to create. From the standpoint of the receiving states, international migrants are aliens, not just strangers. Their arrival makes the relationship between nationals and foreigners a matter of domestic as well as foreign policy. A similar situation holds on the sending side, as international migration represents a two-fold threat to the sending state's power. Exit weakens the "home" state's ability to cage and penetrate its population. Access to another territory and its greater economic and ideological resources gives migrants newfound leverage to effect change at home.
Migration represents both threat and opportunity for sending and receiving states that negotiate bilateral agreements like the bracero program, which imported Mexicans for work in the United States, or post-war European "guestworker" programs. Wanting labor control and temporary migration without settlement, both sides collude to stifle independent migrant action, which is why sending states can extend surveillance and policing to the territory of the receiving state with the latter's assent. However, even officially invited "guests" come to stay. The same naturally applies to migrations that take a more autonomous form. Once embedded, and at least partially freed from state control, migrant networks create the potential for forms of trans-state social action, to which others in host and home contexts then respond.
As states are membership organizations, with formal citizenship rules conditioning the potential for participation in "host" and "home" contexts (Brubaker, 1992) , migrant membership becomes an object of contestation on both ends of the chain. (Smith, 1994: 9) . Though circumscribing, not preventing, homeland-oriented activities, such suspicions show that cross-state migrant or ethnic membership is not an individual attribute, but rather an accomplishment effected through interaction with a myriad of actors.
While the social organization of international migration variably sustains involvements both "here" and "there," neither membership nor the means of maintaining ties on both sides are matters for migrants to decide on their own. International migrants may "see themselves as transnational, as persons with two homelands," as noted approvingly by Glick Schiller and Fouron (1990: 341) . That view, however, is hardly binding on anyone else, as evidenced by the past century's record of producing refugees without home or host, let alone persons without a state States not only confer a migrant's rights to life in the territory; they regulate contacts across borders In totalitarian states, where emigration is tantamount to betrayal, the "regular and sustained" contacts between source and destination societies that supposedly distinguish "transnationals" from immigrants are not just out of the question, but imperil sending country residents whom the "transnationals" try to contact or help. Even liberal states control the travel of those over whom they have authority, limiting the scope for travel by immigrants whose "home" country stands in hostile relations to their "host."
The relationship among states also affects the conditions under which international migrants and their descendants can pursue "homeland" interests. In general, a peaceful world encourages states to relax the security/solidarity nexus. International tension, let alone belligerence, provides the motivation to tighten up on those whose loyalties extend abroad (Armstrong, 1976 (Weiner, 1993) .
Moreover, migratory and ethnic connections crossing state borders also provide the vehicle for diffusing conflicts from home country to host, adding international tensions to social antagonisms of mainly domestic origin. And alongside the benign activities emphasized by the literature, one has to note the more noxious record of those longdistance migrant and ethnic nationalists who have repeatedly used the most unsavory means.
That migrant and ethnic social action should take benevolent and malignant forms is no accident. They both inherently derive from the stateness of the receiving environment, which constrains the tentacles of the sending state, creating degrees of freedom unknown before migration. Unfortunately, the scholars of immigrant transnationalism have been too fond of the phenomenon they study to notice these unpleasant aspects. Were it otherwise, they would surely not have veered so far toward celebrating the phenomenon they purported to analyze, depicting "transnationalism" as "subversive" and "transnationals" as grassroots actors challenging the hegemony of states and global capitalism "from below" (Rogers et al, 2001 ). Alas, reality bites back, since not all readers conclude that multiple, national loyalties are a good thing. The purported prevalence of transnationalism give those already thinking that the national community is under threat additional reason to worry and insist that boundaries get rolled back (Huntington, 1997) . Understandably, advocates of ethnic trans-state social action find 14 such allergic responses displeasing. However, those reactions fully belong to the phenomenon, to be ignored only at the price of implicating oneself in a subject of which one should uniquely be a student. By limiting the 'transnational' field of study to the generally pacific activities of groups whose cause may appear noble or innocuous, scholars obscure the conditions that foster or limit the full range of long distance nationalisms in both receiving and sending contexts.
Beyond the "here" and "now:" the case for comparison
To reprise, we are not rejecting "transnationalism" to revert to the so-called orthodox "theories" with which this literature is actually twinned. On the contrary, the phenomenon deserves serious scholarly attention, but only when redefined as the collision of the social organization of migration, and its state-spanning results, with reactive efforts by state and civil actors to produce state-society alignment. These interactions involve a multiplicity of actors coming together in a broad range of combinations and variety of circumstances.
However, the very limited sample of cases thus far considered, not the nature of the data collected, makes it hard to assess the range of possibilities. In theory, the literature's reliance on case studies is irrelevant. The investigator can draw on such strategies as the negative, deviant, or critical case study to build in information from a much larger sample and thereby draw reliable inferences based on intensive study of just one case. Similarly, results from sample surveys are generalizable to the populations from which the surveys are drawn, but no further, unless the unstudied populations are instances of the same or similar case. The paper by Guarnizo et al. (2003) surely represents an advance in its systematic comparison of a set of cross-border political activities among three immigrant populations. Yet contemporary international migrations to the United States from small, weak countries on the U.S. periphery capture but a limited portion of the phenomenon in question. To illuminate its full range and gain purchase on the broader set of variables in play, one needs to extend the range of cases.
This is the task we now pursue, though in purely illustrative fashion, given this paper's limited scope.
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Temporal comparisons:
From the outset, the literature on "immigrant transnationalism" insisted that the contemporary experience represented a decisive break with the past. Historians immediately dissented, but the argument for discontinuity proved hard to abandon. For example, Portes and his associates first argued that the case for studying transnationalism rested on the very novelty of the phenomenon itself (1999), but later, noting the historical precedents, sought to rescue the concept by invoking the "fallacy of adumbration."
Conceding that the phenomenon was not new, they found that transnationalism illuminated previously unnoticed parallels linking "contemporary events with similar ones in the past (Portes, 2002: 184) ," and therefore concluded that the concept yielded significant added value.
While agreeing that the phenomenon can be old hat, even as the concept does "new analytical work (R. Smith, forthcoming: 1)," scholars of immigrant transnationalism (Levitt, 2001a; Guarnizo, 2001; R. Smith, 2002; Foner, 2000; Glick Schiller, 1999) still insist that the present significantly diverges from the past:
• technological change has reduced the costs and time entailed in communication and travel;
• the shift from melting pot to multiculturalism has legitimated the expression of and organization around home country loyalties;
• the nationalization of home country societies has increased the salience of the national identities with which immigrants arrived;
• the advent of a new international human rights regime (labeled "postnationalism") has diminished the difference between "nationals" and "foreigners" by circumscribing the power of receiving states.
Few have taken issue with these conclusions, with Morawska's the most notable dissent.
Noting that nothing is ever quite the same, she argued that the "lifeworlds and diaspora politics of turn-of-the-century immigrants share many of the supposedly novel features of present-day transnationalism (2001: 178)."
These well-taken criticisms still leave fundamental difficulties unsaid, beginning with the insistence on a qualitative distinction between an ill-defined and unperiodized "now" and "then". Claiming discontinuity, the students of immigrant transnationalism have effectively dehistoricized the present. They have also reproduced the familiar antinomies of social science, most notably that of a "closed" past and "open" present (Amselle, 2002) , which is why the students of globalization, immigrant "transnationalism," and "transnational relations" all end up with the same "discovery" -that it happened before and in surprisingly similar ways.
More importantly, the students of immigrant transnationalism have not confronted the alternative hypothesis advanced by Arendt (1951) Moreover, contingency should be put back into the flow of history, implying that the current state of affairs is not inevitable, but rather is subject to unpredictable pressures of the sort that burst earlier eras of global interconnection asunder. The technological determinism asserted by the proponents of immigrant "transnationalism" deserves second thought. Earlier, the simple letter knitted together trans-oceanic migration networks with remarkable effectiveness. Moreover, a political environment supportive of immigrant and ethnic long-distance nationalism should hardly be taken for granted. If responsibility for modestly relaxing the distinction between nationals and foreigners lies with domestic political actors, and not new international norms or an international human rights regime (Joppke, 1998), then domestic actors can also produce movement in the other direction.
Likewise, the legitimacy currently accorded expression of homeland loyalties is better understood as a product of the moment, not a permanent feature of advanced democracies. Given that migrants' trans-state particularism may conflict with the liberal universalism of groups supporting immigrant rights, and migrants remain susceptible to dual loyalty claims associated with restrictive conceptions of the national community, a scaling back is always possible.
Consequently, the analytic task can proceed neither through the construction of categorical oppositions, nor the search for parallels between "now" and "then". Rather, one should focus on temporal variation in the political constellations shaping the environment for trans-state ethnic and migrant social action, and the sources of that change. We identify two axes of variation around which structured historical comparisons can be pursued, one relating to a characteristic of the migrants, the second to characteristics of the inter-state system.
The migrants:
The trans-state particularism described as "immigrant transnationalism" presumes migrants, coming from nationalized societies where identity is defined by contrast to alien peoples and lands. However, the presence of trans-state social connections may not imply "long-distance nationalism." The peasant migrants of the turn of the 20 th century engaged in circular or recurrent migration and clustered in jobs and neighborhoods alongside their fellow hometowners, whom they joined in more formal associations. But as they also came from a set of folk societies not yet nationalized, they lacked the common traits and corporate sense that nation-building processes impart. Consequently, the literature (e.g., Foner, 2000: 173) engages in anachronism, when insisting that
persons not yet knowing that they were Italians or Poles, but intensely loyal to this hometown and not its neighbor, were nonetheless the "quintessential transnational(s).". The contemporary era of mass migration belongs to a different world, or so it appeared until just recently. While new technologies may facilitate trans-state ties, they were seen as embedded in a more pacific world order, in which national allegiances have once again been allowed to overlap, as opposed to the mutual exclusivity expected for most of the short 20 th century. Not all groups are equally lucky in this respect.
Immigrants from countries with unfriendly relationships to the United States run the risk of falling into the "enemy alien" trap. That long-distance nationalism in all of its forms (including that of the time-honored ethnic lobby) does not come so easily to Arab
Americans shows that the exception proves the rule: when loyalty is in question, longdistance nationalism is a hazardous game.
Just how the sudden inflection of international tension in the early 21 st century will affect the pursuit of immigrant and ethnic homeland loyalties is anyone's guess. But the lessons of history indicate that perception of external threat builds support for a more restrictive view of the national community. Past experience also shows that the American state has the capacity to monitor, control, and restrict the trans-state social action of international migrants and their descendants; whether and to what extent that capacity will be activated is a matter to which scholars of immigrant "transnationalism" will surely want to attend.
International comparisons:
The international dimension of migration is under-appreciated by U.S. scholars.
Allowing national borders to define the field of study, they have obscured the nation- Further insight is gained by assessing the implications of differences in political structure, loosely controlling for political culture. Focusing on ethnoculturally plural 24 systems --the United States, Canada, and Australia --highlights the relevance of the former's political fragmentation. The loose coupling of U.S. politics at federal, state, and local levels often contains the politics of long-distance nationalism to local or state levels, without ramifying nationally. Consequently, fragmentation averts the outcome most likely to increase the possibility of a negative ethnocultural reaction based on the premise that "politics stops at the water's edge." On the other hand, the relatively fragmented nature of U.S. federal politics motivates ethnic lobbying, as it does all other forms of interest group politics, none of which would be as potent were the national polity organized as a unitary regime. Thus, even within similarly pluralistic ethnocultural systems, the greater pluralism of the United States' political structure facilitates the legitimate mobilization of immigrant and ethnic trans-state social action.
Conclusion
International migrants usually have good reason to leave home, but once abroad, they are often motivated to sustain a connection to the town, region, or "nation" left behind. Members of the nation-state societies to which the migrants have moved, however, frequently find these displays of concern and affection disconcerting. It is not simply that the migrants are failing to detach themselves from their old worlds -as social science wisdom and popular belief prescribe. In a world of mutually exclusive nationstates, rather, persons with foreign attachments are open to question, and all the more so when the relevant nation-states co-exist on less than friendly terms.
Historically-oriented scholars will remind us that there is no news here, though no one wants to fall into the trap of saying plus ça change, plus c'est la même chose. The problem is that the professional students of international migration and ethnicity have not broken with the everyday assumptions of the world in which they live, agreeing that the bounds of "society" and the "nation-state" normally converge. Conceptualizing the process as "immigration" -one in which people move for the purposes of settlementthey contend that attachments to the home left behind are imports that inevitably fade, as immigrants and their descendants gradually assimilate into a "mainstream" whose social ties are bounded at the water's edge.
To the students of immigrant transnationalism goes the great credit of seeing that connections between "here" and "there" are an inherent and enduring component of the long-distance migrations of the modern world. While implicitly rejecting the view that social relations should be contained within the boundaries of a state, however, the students of immigrant transnationalism have unfortunately forgotten about the processes that produce a container society -whether driven by states' efforts to bound the societies they enclose, or more informal, ethnocultural membership practices that aspire to the same goal. Therefore, the better view lies beyond the simplistic dichotomy of assimilation versus transnationalism, as these are not theories but rather social processes, inextricably intertwined. It is just such a perspective, emphasizing the regularity of international migration and its inevitable collision with the mechanisms by which nationstates attempt to keep themselves apart from the world, that we have tried to develop in these pages.
